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In the early 1990s, anybody who said they knew
how to transform a centrally planned economy and
one-party state into a market economy and democ-
racy was lying. In each country affected the task
was vast and there was no body of specific knowl-
edge or theory to draw on because such a transfor-
mation had not been attempted before. Yet the
challenge was posed in over two dozen countries,
in all of which the previous political system had
collapsed within a period of barely two years.
This issue of the IDS Bulletin takes stock of devel-
opments since then with a series of articles looking
at specific aspects of the transition, many of them
case studies, in countries spread from Albania via
Russia to Kyrgyzstan and Vietnam. It arises from an
initiative taken by alumni of the institute who have
worked in such countries, many of them saddened
and frustrated by the lack of developmental per-
spective they encountered. With the recent foun-
dation of a lively IDS Alumni Association, this
bulletin is intended as the first in an occasional
series of IDS bulletins to be inspired and edited by
the institute's former students.
Of the articles printed, four were contributed by
IDS alumni (two of them with non-IDS collabora-
tors), and a fifth is by the director. Of the four
alumni, one has a university position in the UK and
three are practitioners in aid and advisory work.
The other four articles are written by university
researchers from elsewhere, including transition
countries, one of them a lawyer at Sussex
University's European Institute.
The articles mainly cover the economics of transi-
tion and its social effects. With one notable excep-
tion, the countries analysed are those of the former
Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, where the previous
order collapsed and the transition has been led by
a new form of government (or a completely new
state after independence). The main emphasis is on
the poorer transition countries, and general state-
ments made here do not necessarily apply to more
advanced countries such as the Czech Republic,
Poland or Slovenia. This introductory article next
discusses the dominant theory of transition, and
presents the articles that comprise this bulletin.
Finally, some thoughts are offered about the
developmental character of transition.
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I Transition orthodoxy and the
transition
If in 1990 nobody knew how to undertake the tran-
sition, few were prepared to admit as much. The
major international institutions had a ready-made
formula to hand: the so-called Washington
Consensus through which the problems arising
from the international debt crisis had been tackled
in the 1980s. Financial support and aid to the ex-
communist countries were to come from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
which prescribed essentially the same medicines as
in developing countries a few years before. Since
the emphasis of Third World structural adjustment
in the 1980s lay in opening economies up to the
outside world, getting their prices right and reduc-
ing state intervention, there was a superficial logic
in bringing the same package to places where a
closed, state-administered economic system had
been so dramatically overthrown. The record of
structural adjustment was, however, mixed, even in
countries with established market institutions and
well integrated in the world economy The appro-
priateness of its instruments in countries which
lacked such a framework for their application was
even more open to doubt.
In line with structural adjustment, the main ele-
ments of orthodox transition policy came to be
macro-economic stabilisation, the liberalisation of
prices and foreign trade, and the privatisation of
enterprises. But these came up against what a recent
article in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy
called the five 'surprises of transformation' (Eilman
1997: 26). It is worth examining these surprises in
some detail since they reveal much about the think-
ing behind the orthodox view.
The first surprise, according to Eliman, lay in 'how
much the populations of those countries have been
prepared to put up with'. This indeed surprised
domestic commentators as often as foreign
observers: the present author has lost count of the
number of times since 1990 that either local or for-
eign commentators in Russia and neighbouring
countries have assured him that on current policies,
a social explosion or civil war was inevitable. Yet
only in Albania in 1997 has there actually been an
explosion (see Holland's article below); and
although there have been civil wars, and unusually
brutal ones too, they were largely confined to three
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regions: the mountains of the Pamir, Caucasus and
Balkan ranges.
What conclusion can be drawn from this first sur-
prise? It surely lies in the political character of the
societies which moved into transition. Although in
many countries the collapse of communism found
mass support, active opposition to the former
regime was generally restricted to intellectuals. In
the final days and months, many members of the
elites also could see advantages for themselves in a
new system based on private property Mass mobil-
isation occurred only in a few countries where there
was a particularly strong sense of having been
colonised (e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or
where new trade unions developed alongside the
democratic movements (in Poland back in 1980,
and later in Azerbaijan, the coal-mining areas of
Russia, and to an extent in Bulgaria). In general, the
political passivity engendered by communism has
outlived it, which can only strengthen doubts about
the speed with which democracy can develop.
The second surprise cited by ElIman lies in the
importance of the banking system and financial
fragility Over the early years of the return to capi-
talism in these countries there have been several
major banking crises (e.g. in Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Kazakstan, Lithuania and Russia) as well
as mass frauds using pyramid investment schemes
(in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia). Ellman
(1997: 27) points out that 'With some exceptions
there was little attention in initial policy proposals
and policy discussions to the role of the banks'.
True as this may be, it does seem odd. Where after
all does the essential difference between central
planning and a market economy lie? Surely in the
role played in the latter by money prices and credit,
which serve to allocate resources that under com-
munism were centrally administered. Even if it were
not obvious at the start how the transition was to be
undertaken overall, it seems hard to understand
why the creation of effective financial systems was
not seen as a central priority
Ellman's third surprise is the need for 'a limited but
strong state' and 'effective public administration
The general tendency among local neo-liberals and
their international backers was to concentrate on
building the market sector and neglect the need to
maintain and develop the state' (ElIman 1997: 27).
Quite so. But this seems to have ignored decades of
debate among economic historians, political econo-
mists and development theorists about the role of
the state in economic transformations. The domes-
tic strength of communist states disappeared with
the removal of their backbone (the ruling party)
and the disempowerment of their main organs of
social control (the secret police). In all too many
cases (especially in the former Soviet Union, or
FSU), the state has become weak and now repre-
sents few social interests beyond the people who
work in it, or it is easily captured by powerful
unrepresentative forces such as big finance. Lacking
developed institutions of accountability, and mis-
trusted and even despised by its own citizens, such
a state is in a poor position to lead the mammoth
operation of transition.
The fourth surprise quoted by Eilman 'is that the
transformation is a long and difficult process',
which he relates to 'the inattention of many econo-
mists to institutions and the specificities of the insti-
tutional inheritance of the transformation
countries'. If that is so, then the process ought not
to have been left in the hands of economists. This
writer clearly recalls reading in 1990 a persuasive
paper by a group of distinguished economic histo-
rians and others, which argued that this transfor-
mation could only be a long and arduous task.' For
what is it, if not the wholesale replacement of one
set of economic, social, political and even cultural
institutions by another? This transformation is char-
acterised, more than almost any deliberately under-
taken before it, by its sheer breadth and scale,
affecting virtually every aspect of society and not
the economy alone. So it was surely bound to be
long and difficult; to have seen it otherwise in 1990
seemed then (and seems now) bizarre.
Finally, Ellman (1997: 27) states that it came as a
surprise that the privatisation of inherited large-
scale state-owned enterprises was unimportant for
economic growth, when compared with the rapid
development of new private firms. The Washington
Consensus took the quick privatïsation of such
enterprises as 'an article of faith'. Ellman notes that
The paper was borrowed from a colleague and I did
not keep its reference.
The same report called the commercial banking
infrastructure an 'urgent' requirement, arguing: 'A
market economy also requires a means of allocating
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a few individual writers did not see it that way; but
neither did every international institution. The UN
Economic Commission for Europe in 1991 divided
the economic transformation between 'urgent',
'desirable speedy' and 'longer-term' tasks. In the
third category came 'starting the process of "large
privatization" through the outright sale of state-
owned enterprises', although their 'corporatization'
and 'commercialization' were in the second cate-
gory and the beginning of their restructuring in the
first: 'The sale of state assets can ... be regarded as
the final stage in this process' (UNECE 1991:
127-33).' Like its neglect of the state, the neo-lib-
eral consensus seemingly considered that a formal
change of ownership was enough in itself: if people
had private assets to play with, that alone would
provide the required incentive to manage them
effectively and earn good returns. In practice, quite
apart from delapidated machinery and shortages of
equity and working capital, turning around such
enterprises has hit innumerable institutional and
cultural obstacles.
In the light of these events, Ellman (1997: 29)
points to 'the gradual emergence of a new conven-
tional wisdom', dropping the insistence on rapid
privatisation and positive real interest rates, but
continuing to stress the need for fiscal discipline,
rapid price and trade liberalisation and the restraint
of inflation. This new wisdom also recognises the
importance of public administration, corporate
governance, the banking system, new private enter-
prises, modest tariff protection in some circum-
stances, public goods and transfer payments.
To someone with a training in development studies
rather than pure economics, what seems surprising
about many of these 'surprises' is that they should
have surprised any thoughtful analysts at all. The
problem lay less in economics as such than in the
economic dogma which dominated at the time. It
was the ex-communist nations' bad luck to require
vital advice from abroad just when the influence of
neo-liberalism was at its peak; to domestic oppo-
nents of communism, neo-liberal simplicities
seemed to confirm their aversion to any role for the
assets, that is a capital market. This will have to be
created from scratch and is likely to be difficult.., the
most elementary functions of banks in a money
economy have to be firmly established.' (UNECE 1991:
128)
state in the economy and their dream of gaining the
benefits of advanced capitalism overnight. Much of
what was neglected in the Washington Consensus
was in fact pointed out by others early in the tran-
sition process. But no doubt because those that
pointed it out lacked influence in the right places, it
was ignored; and when their analysis later proved
correct, this was labelled a 'surprise'. The next sec-
tion of this introduction presents the articles in this
bulletin in the light of these comments.
2 The evidence of this bulletin
The first articles in this bulletin discuss major eco-
nomic themes of the transition, including macro-
economic policy, enterprise case studies, and
science and technology There follow four articles
examining the non-economic environment, starting
with the development of commercial law and going
on to new entrepreneurs, social relations in Albania
and the rural poor. The final article places the news
media in their economic context.
As a backdrop for the remaining articles, this bul-
letin includes an abridged extract from the United
Nations' annual Economic Survey of Europe of
1995, reviewing the progress made over the first
five years or so of reform. As already indicated, the
UNECE's secretariat can claim a proud record in
identifying many of the problems of the transition
before they occurred, rather than being taken by
surprise like others. Perhaps this was because it
already had a long experience of those economies.
This record means that its later analyses deserve to
be read with respect.
The article printed here makes it clear that by the
mid-1990s, the mood was of disillusionment as the
economic benefits of reform had not spread far:
most citizens encountered falling living standards,
rapid inflation and declining job opportunities.
There has been some improvement over the inter-
vening three years. Economic growth in the most
successful countries is now rapid (8 per cent in
Estonia and 7 per cent in Poland in 1997) and, even
in Russia, the economy has stopped shrinking for
the first time since the 1980s (Economist, 18 April
1998). But the legacy remains, and the UNECE's
article provides a full survey of the reasons for the
disappointments encountered as well as their likely
consequences.
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Lines's article examines Russias continuing pro-
found difficulties. He is not alone in arguing that
Russia's transition has already failed. The reasons
are no doubt complex and deeply rooted in history,
but an important proximate cause lies in the rapid
inflation which followed sudden price liberalisation
in 1992 and the way it was handled. The inflation
destroyed savings, while associated tight monetary
policies contributed much to a chronic liquidity
shortage, the demonetisation of the economy, and
the present crisis in government revenues. The
growing prevalence of barter and payments in kind
was, like other aspects of demonetisation, entirely
unexpected; it was more reasonable to expect that
the development of market relations would margin-
alise such habits.
The importance of Russia policies transcends its
position as one transition country among several.
This is not just the largest country in the region but
it provided the model, heart and muscles of the for-
mer system. Its influence over the rest of the FSU
remains strong; and although many neighbours had
grave doubts about rapid price liberalisation, in
1992 they still shared a common currency and
many other ties and so had little choice but to go
down the same path.
Both the UNECE and Lines discuss in passing the
failure of many transition countries to ensure that
companies become more efficient by reducing the
amount of labour employed per unit of output.
Azad & Boysan examine Kazakstan with two case
studies of companies producing consumer goods,
one an inherited enterprise and the other, more suc-
cessful one, a new firm established in 1990. They
also point to the limited extent of restructuring in
the traditional industrial company The new firm,
however, rapidly expanded employment by pro-
ducing high-quality goods for much lower prices
than did importers. This was not all achieved by
extra efficiency, however: sales fell when its close
relationship with the Kazakstan authorities failed to
prevent the liberalisation of imports. Azad &
Boysan recommend government intervention to
assist the restructuring of firms in Kazakstan. A fur-
ther thought provoked by this article is that privati-
sation may have been grossly overemphasised as a
policy instrument of restructuring.
The next two articles look at industrial develop-
ment in two very different countries, Russia and
Vietnam. Couderc & Franceschi provide a case
study of high-technology firms set up by scientists
in the Siberian research city of Akademgorodok.
This appears to have been largely a distress devel-
opment arising from the loss of state funding for
science after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A
muddled but market-led response was able to
emerge, even in Russia depressed conditions.
Bezanson looks at science and technology from the
other end, as it were. In a smaller country where the
former political system remains intact, he considers
the issues involved in a government policy to pro-
mote science and technology for industrial develop-
ment. The discussion is set in the context of
globalisation, which at once makes the establish-
ment of such intervention more difficult and ren-
ders a subtle version of it more important if
Vietnam is to develop export-led manufacturing
against even sharper competition from East Asia
after the 1997 crisis. There is an implied assump-
tion that the government will have the administra-
tive capacity to pursue such a course: this may well
be true in Vietnam, but it would not obviously be
so in many transition countries further west.
There is a consensus among economists today
about the importance of knowledge and education
for success in the world economy; some go so far as
to define knowledge as a fourth factor of produc-
tion. It has also been long accepted that one of the
greatest successes of the Soviet Union and its allies
lay in education and science. Yet the huge literature
that now exists on the transition has little to say
about how in future such resources might be har-
nessed to development. Especially in the PSU, they
are allowed to wither on the vine. Teachers leave
schools for better-paid jobs, scientific research goes
unfunded, while the equipment base of surviving
industry and agriculture is debilitated. Like man-
agement development and corporate governance,
these vital micro-economic needs have been over-
shadowed by policy emphases on the macro-
economy
Dragneva examines the development of another
essential support for the market economy, commer-
cial law, and in particular the arrangements for
resolving disputes over contracts. This has as
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important a role to play in imposing hard con-
straints on enterprises as the use of bankruptcy law
In Russia, the present writer has heard a commer-
cially successful farmer insist to others that an
essential part of her skill lay in the readiness to take
bad customers to court rather than accept second-
best solutions such as late payment or payment in
kind. This requires effective commercial courts or
non-judicial disputes procedures. Dragneva traces
the development of these in Bulgaria, showing how
it has been delayed by political confusion and the
inevitable difficulties of gathering judicial experi-
ence in a country where commerce was outlawed
for nearly half a century. This points again to the
long, painstaking nature of the institution-building
required. The article illustrates the danger of a hasty
approach to the transition: if the old system is bro-
ken up before new institutions can be established,
this plays into the hands of vested elite interests
who can manipulate uncertainties in the situation
to their advantage.
The final four articles examine further the broader
domestic context. In the first of these, Roberts &
Tholen report on a sociological survey of young
entrepreneurs in seven countries, three of them in
the PSU and four in East and Central Europe (ECE).
They reach two important conclusions. One lies in
how the common points in the business environ-
ment in all seven countries set them apart from
established market economies. But secondly, major
differences were found between entrepreneurs in
the two groups of countries. The ECE group were
more likely to foresee a long-term career in private
business. Those in the ex-Soviet countries were
more highly educated but operated more as generic
businessmen or dealers, seeking to make money
quickly out of fear for the future security of com-
merce. They were more likely to operate in the
informal sector, while business was dominated by
sub-legal networks (which were exclusively male).
Roberts & Tholen draw a broader conclusion, that
the ECE economies will grow in time to resemble
those of Western Europe, while the mafia-style cap-
italism of the FSU will form a type apart. For it to
develop otherwise, a reform of politics and state
administration will be required first.
The next two articles look at small, formerly iso-
lated countries which are a long way apart: Albania
and Kyrgyzstan. Holland's study of Albania exam-
ines a case where the breakdown of law and order
went further than that witnessed by Roberts &
Tholen in the FSU. Holland examines the difficul-
ties of establishing cooperation among farmers in a
rural development project, and sets this against the
general issue of interpersonal trust. The historical
lack of such trust, she argues, holds back this soci-
ety's ability to create strong institutions and net-
works capable of handling the difficulties of
transition.
The very title of Howell's article hints at the need to
examine transition societies at the micro-level. The
author provides a vivid survey of the impact of the
early years of transition on the everyday life of poor
households in a remote country with few resources.
She draws out the differences in experience
between social groups and between different places.
What she found was a variety of personal initiatives
to find new sources of income, with evidence of dis-
tress selling such as the reduction in size of live-
stock herds. The impact on social facilities is
examined, including the effect on children, whose
education has been affected, for example, by a
reduction in the number of books that the country
can afford to publish.
Babunski assesses the media's relationship with the
new political and economic forces in another small,
landlocked country, Macedonia. Afflicted for a
period by a double embargo, with its main trade
routes to the north and south closed by external
political forces, the international setting for
Macedonia's transition has been among the hardest.
The consequent delays in the transition, Babunski
argues, have forced media outlets into continued
dependence on state patronage and, by weakening
their economic base, compromised their chances of
aiding the development of civil society
What general conclusions can be drawn from this
series of studies? An immediate one lies in the
broad similarity of the issues faced in countries
which are long distances apart and had widely var-
ied histories before 1917 or 1945: this is a set of
variations on a common theme. We see the sheer
difficulty of the transition and the obstacles that
have lain in its path. Macedonia is very different
from Kazakstan, yet in both (as well as in Bulgaria
and the ex-Soviet countries described by Roberts
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and Tholen) we see for example the importance of
personal links between successful businesses and
the state. In the FSU, the results of a strategy built
narrowly on price reform, stabilisation and formal
privatisation appear generally to have been of
uncertain value, leading to corrupt, criminalised
economies with at best limited gains in productive
efficiency In general since 1990, new opportunities
have opened up for two groups of people: those
able and willing to expose themselves to economic
risk as entrepreneurs (see Azad & Boysan, Couderc
& Franceschi, Roberts & Tholen), and those in a
position to extract an economic rent from the con-
trol of assets (Babunski, Dragneva and Holland).
Many ordinary people, on the other hand, have
faced great distress, with a sharp decline in living
standards and the sudden loss of former sources of
security (see Couderc & Franceschi, Holland,
Howell, Lines and UNECE).
Regional, national and even local circumstances dif-
fer, and several authors point to the importance of
both research and policy initiatives at the micro-
level (Holland, Howell and Roberts & Tholen). We
also witness the primordial importance of long-
term institutional change: inherently a developmen-
tal question. And in very different contexts, we find
advocacy of government intervention to stimulate
industrial development (or redevelopment), albeit
by different means in Kazakstan (Azad & Boysan)
and Vietnam (Bezanson). Couderc & Franceschi,
however, describe a case where the market is find-
ing its own solution for science and technology,
research and development.
3 Transition and development
It is useful to consider the relationship between the
transition of formerly communist countries and
economic development in general. In the early years
of transition, ex-communist countries were
observed with a degree of suspicion by developing
countries and many of their advocates abroad.
Countries of the South feared competition for tight
resources from traditionally richer societies which
were considered to be already scientifically
advanced and industrially developed.
This attitude was fully understandable in the cir-
cumstances but was surely based on a misappre-
hension. While centrally planned economies were
by the 1980s not underdeveloped, perhaps they
could be described as misdeveloped. And their sub-
sequent experience has often been one of undevel-
opment: people have grown significantly poorer
and less secure and the economy has slipped down
the developmental ladder. Much of manufacturing
industry (especially light industry) has collapsed,
ceding markets to producers from other parts of the
world. This threatens to turn the countries back
into producers of primary commodities for world
markets, despite the formidable upheaval of forced
industrialisation earlier this century Russian econo-
mists call this process pnmitivirovaniye, or primitivi-
sation.
Many of the articles in this volume point to the
damaging lack of a long-term, developmental per-
spective in the approaches taken to post-commu-
nist transition (e.g. Holland, Lines and Roberts &
Tholen). This introductory article concludes with a
discussion of the relevance of some of the tradi-
tional themes of development thought.
Multi-disciplinarity. The replacement of central
planning and one-party police states by market
economies, democracy and the rule of law is emi-
nently multi-disciplinary: it is a complex set of
interdependent problems, affecting nearly all
aspects of the economy and society The central task
involves the replacement of one set of social, politi-
cal and economic institutions by another; but as
argued by Ellman, the economists who have domi-
nated the transition discourse have tended to over-
look institutional questions, which might be better
addressed by specialists from other disciplines.
Even within economics, there is the suggestion that
macro-economic approaches have taken too much
of the stage to the detriment of micro-economic
work with enterprises.
A multi-disciplinary approach therefore seems
essential, including its counterpart: it must be
geared to the specifics of each situation. This, oddly,
explains the reluctance of some of the best develop-
ment professionals to get involved: while there are
many points of overlap, the historical background
and developmental problems faced by transition
countries differ from those of most developing
countries, making the scene unfamiliar to such peo-
ple. Yet it is partly by virtue of their situation-spe-
cific methods that their skills are needed.
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Catching up. This term is most often applied to the
requirements of countries which have not gone
through the industrial and agricultural revolutions,
or only partially, and want to emulate countries
which have. As such, this applies to few ex-com-
munist countries, since they entered the transition
with broad industrial bases, relatively high educa-
tional standards and good welfare indicators. Some
of this has been dissipated already in the process of
transition (Russian male life expectancy at birth fell
from 64.2 years in 1989 to 58.0 years in 1995;
Yaqub 1998: Table 3). But they have a different,
equally urgent need to catch up, arising from the
experience of between 40 and 75 years in closed,
centrally planned economies and closed societies.
At the start of the transition, there was a limited
understanding of many concepts which people
brought up in market-based societies take for
granted, such as the link between a product's price
and its costs of production. Methods of manage-
ment under central planning were very rudimen-
tary, and personal experience suggests that even
skills such as office management barely existed.
There was no interaction with the international
economy, except at senior levels in capital cities.
The more remote and formerly closed the society
involved, the bigger these disadvantages appear.
However exploitative the relationship between
world markets and developing countries may have
been, at least a relationship was there, providing
some understanding of how markets operate. The
transition countries, on the other hand, face an
immense task in catching up on the half-century or
more of growing sophistication in the capitalist sys-
tem that took place while their backs were turned.
State y. market. This introductory article has
touched on a revised form of the traditional devel-
opment debate of the 1960s and 1970s. Clearly, in
this context the debate no longer opposes a free-
market model against full state ownership and con-
trol of the economy But questions remain: how
fully and quickly markets should be (or should
have been) liberated, what are the appropriate
forms of state intervention in the new circum-
stances, and how these can be addressed. These
questions are posed in one form or another in sev-
eral articles in this volume (e.g. Azad & Boysan and
Bezanson).
The developmental state. The previous question
leads on directly to another set of questions which
have been widely overlooked in the transition
debate: what is the nature of the states that have
risen from the ashes of one-party rule, how appro-
priate is it to developmental functions, and how (if
at all) can it be reformed to take up those responsi-
bilities? The creation of a developmental state in
this setting is one of the most challenging require-
ments of all. The state in former times was domi-
neering, meddlesome and all-powerful, and its
officials in many countries are still accustomed to
working in that manner. To win even an under-
standing of the concept of an enabling state, as
understood in liberal societies, can be difficult; to
achieve corresponding alterations in policy and
behaviour is substantially more so. In many cases,
the best that can be expected is for the state to pull
back from former functions entirely, and re-form
later in a more sensitive and focussed way This can
be terribly wasteful and risks a continuation of
chaos in the meantime; but it is often a better solu-
tion than to allow any understanding to endure that
the accustomed methods can achieve the goals of a
liberal society
Dutch disease. Many ex-communist countries face
for the first time specific economic risks which are
well known to developing countries, and do not
have appropriate experience to recognise them.
One of these is that inward direct investment can
bring as many problems as benefits. Another is
associated with the aforementioned tendency of
some countries to slide down the developmental
scale, turning from manufacturing or industrial
processing to primary products. Many countries
(e.g. Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan) fore-
see future prosperity from exploiting minerals such
as oil, gas and gold. But it is well known from expe-
rience elsewhere that this can seriously destabilise
the rest of an economy Such a risk can face
economies at any stage of development: the term for
the phenomenon, Dutch disease, is taken from the
consequences of exploiting the Netherlands' gas
fields in the late 1950s; and the UK faced a similar
problem in the early 1980s, when the first exports
of North Sea oil contributed to an overvaluation of
the currency, with devastating consequences for
manufacturing industry and employment.
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Arguably, Russia already suffers from a variant of
Dutch disease. In recent years it has built up a sub-
stantial trade surplus (US$21.2 billion in 1997;
Economist, 28 March 1998), largely through the
export of products such as oil, gas, gold, alu-
minium, nickel and palladium. Many of the most
prosperous companies in Russia are in this sector,
and they exert a strong influence over its politics,
economics and finance. The trade surplus is partly
needed to finance payments on the international
debts inherited from the Soviet Union, but it has
also contributed to a rising real value of the rouble
on foreign exchange markets. This in turn renders
the environment for producers of other tradeable
goods all the more difficult, further reducing the
chances of maintaining a broad industrial base.
Transition to what? There is no satisfactory general
term for the countries discussed in this bulletin.
References to their past, such as ex-communist or
post-communist, may accurately allude to a com-
mon set of problems, but are inappropriate when
looking to the future. They can also be unpopular
in the countries themselves. The term which has
become most widely used is 'transition' countries,
and it is adopted in this journal for the sake of con-
venience. However, it begs its own set of questions:
in many mouths, it seems to presuppose a direction
towards an ideal type of free-market economy, on a
model which is in some sense thought to be repre-
sented in the capitalist West. But is this a desirable
direction to head in? Are the Western countries ade-
quate models? Can their pattern of liberal, market-
based pluralism be reproduced in the circumstances
created by the collapse of communism? In this vol-
ume, Roberts & Tholen argue that the form of cap-
italism developing in Armenia, Georgia and the
Ukraine already appears to be different from
Central and Eastern Europe. Lines points to the
dangers of applying a simplistic neo-liberal formula
to the complex requirements of institutional
change, while both Holland and Howell illustrate
the often negative impact of change on ordinary
citizens.
It is well past time to abandon the idea of a quick
transit into what Marxists would call another mode
of production; the notion of restarting develop-
ment, with all its complex and multiple directions,
ought to take over.
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